Life sciences innovation has prompted both optimism and angst, and has been the subject of intensive economic and commercial activity. That activity has been supported by legal institutions and mechanisms in the form of intellectual property law deployments. However, recent jurisprudence has put the unaltered pursuit of commercial gain in the life sciences into some (slight) doubt, and has reinvigorated the so-called 'life patents' debate. This paper considers these recent judicial developments, focusing in particular on how different narratives and approaches to biovalue have coloured litigant approaches. It goes on to consider briefly what these cases and the divergent world views represented within them might mean for the regulation of life science commercial practices moving forward.
Introduction
Events like the cloning of Dolly the sheep, 1 the completion of a draft sequence of the human genome 2 and innovations in stem cell research techniques 3 have prompted technological, economic and social optimism while simultaneously inciting moral controversy and social angst. However, the latter has not stopped actors (researchers and entrepreneurs) from pursuing the economic fruits of our emerging bio-knowledge and its concomitant technologies, sometimes aggressively, or from using legal institutions and mechanisms, most particularly intellectual property law, to do so. And while their actions have led to (further) social, political and academic debate, particularly around the propriety of commercialisation in the bio-health field, they have not been much restrained in pursuing their chosen course. However, recent jurisprudence from the United States -Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v United States Patent and Trademark Office et al. (Myriad) , 4 which relates to genetic diagnostic tests -and from Europe -Bru¨stle v Greenpeace e.V. (Bru¨stle), 5 which relates to stem cell techniques -has put the unaltered pursuit of this course into some (slight) doubt, and it has reinvigorated the so-called 'life patents' debate. This paper considers these cases, offering a view about what they mean and where we are moving. In order to understand them, however, we must first look at the background against which they were contested.
Biovalue and value debates
Advances in the life sciences have given rise to the idea of 'biovalue', which refers to the realisation of value in the form of new knowledge and physiological capabilities through the manipulation of living tissue/matter. Described as the 'capitalisation on life', it can be understood as follows:
1. For more on Dolly, see T. Wimmer, Cloning: Dolly the Sheep (Minnesota, MI: Creative Education, 2009). 2. For more on the Human Genome Project (1990 Project ( -2003 , which conducted this work in competition with a commercial project, see http://www. Biovalue refers to the yield of vitality produced by the biotechnical reformulation of living processes. Biotechnology tries to gain traction in living processes, to induce them to increase or change their productivity along specified lines, intensify their self-reproducing and self-maintaining capacities. This intensification . . . of living process typically takes place not at the level of the body as a macro-anatomical system but at the level of the cellular or molecular fragment, the mRNA, the bacterium, the oocyte, the stem cell. Moreover it takes place not in vivo but in vitro, a vitality engineered in the laboratory, where . . . the biological fragment is constituted as a potentially discrete, knowable, and exploitable reservoir of molecular and biochemical products and events. Here a repertoire of biotechnical procedures can be developed that induce the fragment to expand, to accelerate or slow down, to unfurl or recapacitate, to produce new substances or develop along new pathways, to recombine with other fragments and swap properties. In short biotechnology finds insertion points between living and non-living systems where new and contingent forms of vitality can be created, capitalizing on life. 6
In essence, through evolving processes that induce living material to increase or change their productivity along specific lines, or to intensify their reproduction and/or maintenance capacities, we exploit the biological to develop improved biotechnical procedures.
Unsurprisingly, this 'capitalisation on life' has happened within the context of, and indeed has often been driven by, capitalism, by commercial interests and projects that are as concerned with financial gain as they are with advancing knowledge, benefitting human health or improving health care (though we should certainly expect and demand that they do indeed realise the latter goals). So 'biovalue' might also be interpreted to mean the extraction of (economic) value from living tissue/matter. The adoption of the term 'bioeconomy' should signal that commercial development is and was always a fundamental motivator in the contemporary life sciences innovation setting. That being the case, property law, and specifically intellectual property law, 7 is and was always going to be an important shaper of innovation and the health products (tests and treatments) that are authorised. 8 Being the first to discover and patent new life sciences knowledge, techniques and technologies allows actors to accumulate intellectual property portfolios, the marketing of access to which gives rise to significant economic value. Many actors in the life sciences field have consistently argued that intellectual property, particularly patenting, is integral to innovation, and they have worked successfully to expand the scope of patentability. 9 Given the early stages of our knowledge, the cumulative nature of scientific progress and the intimacy of genetic and genomic information with human health and identity, it might be unsurprising to note that dismay was very early on expressed at some of these technologies and their entanglement with commercial interests. In fact, numerous sociopolitical conflicts have been fought around the life sciences, many of them driven by divergent world views and moral positions, 10 and one of the primary and enduring points of contention has been the propriety of commercialisation (or patenting) in this field, a matter which has led to massive and ongoing public and scholarly debate. 11 Curiously, despite the long-standing debate about the necessity of patents and the righteousness of biovalue (as understood in the second sense), only preliminary investigations into the consequences of patenting in the life sciences have been undertaken to date. 12 The broad conclusion one can draw from this research is that, despite the claims 9. In this regard, note the adoption of the Agreement on and arguments advanced both for and against patenting, very little compelling evidence concerning its impact has been produced. The following sums up the situation:
There is no consensus about whether . . . patents hinder or help in the development and availability of genetic diagnostics, and empirical evidence about how these patents may affect commercialization of new genomic diagnostics is scarce. This seemingly innocuous statement is an advance in the public debate, given that the alleged negative consequences and benefits of patents have so often been grossly overstated. 13 Having said that, there is some evidence that commercialisation pressure and other forces peripherally related to the operation of intellectual property can have and are having some adverse impacts on the life sciences, most notably around the promotion of secrecy, the withholding of data, the undermining or avoidance of collaborative relationships and the formation of perceptions that the integrity of science is reduced when associated with commercial industry. 14 In any event, despite these controversies and despite ambiguity over the evidence relied on by both sides, patenting has mostly proceeded apace, 15 encouraged in no small part by the position expressed by the US Supreme Court (USSC) in Diamond v Chakrabarty, 16 and reiterated in influential international instruments like the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement (1994), 17 that 'anything under the sun made by man' can be patented. Sociopolitical battles over fundamental questions around commercial exploitation were fought in the media, in academia and in legislatures, but not so much in patent offices or patent courts, which blissfully continued to go about their business and eschew the thornier foundational debates around propriety.
However, in Myriad and Bru¨stle, the moral debates have finally crashed directly and unambiguously into the patent cases themselves. These are not 'garden variety' patent infringement disputes fought between competitors niggling over the minutiae of patent criteria. 18 Rather, they are policy-grounded cases fought between scientists and entrepreneurs, on the one hand, and a diverse range of highly motivated stakeholders (patients and rights groups, etc.), on the other. Often troubled by the very idea of 'life patents', these opponents bring a new narrative to the contest. Of course, the reasons for different stakeholders' interests and positions are many and varied, but they often relate in some way to concerns about the very notions of 'biovalue' and a 'bioeconomy', and about what those socio-economic concepts might mean for the human condition.
Myriad: flux and uncertainty around diagnostics patents?
In Myriad, a group of plaintiffs led by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent Foundation filed suit against Myriad Genetics, the US Patent and Trademarks Office (USPTO), and others, alleging that Myriad's patents on two human genes associated with early onset of breast and ovarian cancer -the BRCA1 and BRCA2 geneshampered scientific research, limited accessibility to medical care, were invalid on patent law criteria and were unconstitutional. The patents, which cover the genes themselves (composition patents) and the processes making use of them (process patents), gave Myriad a lucrative monopoly to conduct or license medical tests relating to the genes, and Myriad has become notorious for its aggressive business model and enforcement practices, particularly within the United States.
While lengthy and heavily procedural, the decision offered by Sweet J turned on the validity of the gene patents. The relevant statutory provision applied was § 101, Title 35, US Code, which states that 'whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.' Sweet J had to determine whether the gene sequences and processes used to test 16. 447 U.S. 303 (USSC) (1980) . In that case, the patentee produced a bacterium that fed on oil and the USSC held that a live, for them were a 'new and useful process . . . or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.' While the USSC has consistently construed § 101 broadly, 19 it is also well-established that § 101 is not unlimited. 20 Three specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles exist, each considered part of human knowledge free to all and exclusive to none, 21 namely: (1) the laws of nature, (2) physical phenomena and (3) abstract ideas.
In the result, in a decision that has been described as 'stunning', 22 and 'jaw-dropping' for its reversal of long-standing USPTO and patenting practice, 23 Sweet J held that the composition patents were invalid because they were products of nature, and the method patents were invalid because they did not relate to any process of transformation or manufacture, but rather to abstract mental processes of comparison or analysis. Unsurprisingly, this decision was appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), 24 which delivered its ruling, a three-opinion decision exceeding 100 pages, in July 2011. 25 All three judges agreed, inter alia, that some kinds of DNA, such as complementary DNA (cDNA) molecules, 26 can be patented, and that five of Myriad's broadest method claims were invalid because they claimed to protect a way of comparing sequences, a mental act that cannot be patented (because it is an abstract idea). However, on the issue of whether naturally occurring sequences can be patented, they were divided. Lourie and Moore JJA agreed that they could be patented, basing their opinions, in part, on a desire not to disrupt practices and expectations that have built up over time. Bryson JA held that they could not, holding that while significant effort was required to find the BRCA genes and their mutations, the genetic coding that is the subject of each gene remains the same whether the gene is in the body or isolated, and the discovery of the sequences is thus unprotectable.
The CAFC decision was passed on to the USSC, and in February 2012, the USSC instructed the CAFC to reassess its judgement in light of the recent USSC ruling in Prometheus. 27 The CAFC heard oral arguments in July 2012, and, in its reassessment, 19 delivered in August 2012, the CAFC reiterated that, although the gene sequences are a product of nature, the process of isolating them requires human intervention and so they can indeed be patented. 28 Unsatisfied, the plaintiffs appealed, and on 30 November 2012, the USSC granted a writ of certiorari with respect to the question of whether isolated DNA molecules are patentable subject matter. So everyone waits with baited breath until June 2013, when the USSC is expected to deliver its decision. That decision may take some guidance from Cancer Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc., 29 a February 2013 decision of the trial division of the Australian Federal Court (AFC). In Cancer Voices Australia, a cancer patient and advocacy group brought suit against Myriad, arguing that naturally occurring substances such as genes cannot be patented as they are 'discoveries' not 'inventions'. The question before the AFC was whether isolated DNA amounts to a 'manner of manufacture' as contained in section 18 of the Australian Patents Act 1990. While Nichols J emphasised that DNA and RNA existing within the cells of the human body cannot be the subject of a valid patent, he affirmed the patentability of isolated human DNA, 30 holding as follows: [88] . . . [A] product that consists of an artificially created state of affairs which has economic significance will constitute a 'manner of manufacture'. . . . In the present case, the question of economic significance may be put aside because, as I have previously mentioned, the applicants accepted that this aspect of the requirements of patentability established by NRDC was satisfied.
As such, Nichols J went on to consider the 'artificial state of affairs', holding that such may manifest itself in different ways. He characterised the issue as whether an isolated and purified nucleic acid, which may be assumed to have precisely the same chemical composition and structure as that found in the cells of some human beings, constitutes an artificial state of affairs. He identified three considerations which led him to conclude that it does 31
In explaining the concept of 'manner of manufacture' as one involving the creation of an artificial state of affairs, the High Court used very expansive language and cautioned that metaphorical analysis may not be helpful. In the absence of human intervention, 'naturally occurring' nucleic acid does not exist outside the cell, and 'isolated' nucleic acid does not exist inside the cell. The latter is the product of human intervention involving extraction and purification. The isolation of a particular microorganism may require immense intellectual effort before it can be made available for use in a product, and it would lead to odd results if a person whose skill and effort culminated in the isolation could not be rewarded by the grant of a patent because the isolated microorganism, no matter how practically useful or economically significant, was held to be inherently non-patentable. 32 The Myriad trial decision caused significant alarm amongst industry stakeholders, but Cancer Voices Australia has ensured a resumption of 'normal services', at least for proponents in Australia. Whereas Sweet J (the United States) concluded that isolated genes were no different from those in their naturally occurring form, at least not in any meaningful way, Nichols J (Australia) concluded otherwise and implicitly rejected the argument that gene patents have a chilling effect on science or on access to health care. Given that the Australian case is in keeping with the majority from the CAFC, there may be less uncertainty here than some might imagine, even in the United States, which still awaits final word from the USSC. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of the imminent USSC case, one feels relatively confident in forecasting that existing practices will be confirmed, though possibly on a narrower basis than before. If that occurs, patentees may have to be more circumspect in their claims and more balanced in their licensing practices or be challenged by researchers.
Brüstle: the final word on stem cell patents?
In Bru¨stle, Greenpeace brought an application for revocation of Brüstle's patent on the grounds that certain claims relied on cells obtained from human embryonic stem cells (hESCs), thereby rendering the invention unpatentable under Article 2 of the German Patent Law, which implements Article 6 of the EU Biotechnology Patenting Directive (BPD). This Article stipulates that patents may not be granted for inventions whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality, and that, in particular, patents may not be granted for uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. The German Patent Court declared the patent invalid insofar as certain claims related to precursor cells obtained from hESCs and to processes for the production of cells derived therefrom.
Brüstle appealed to the German Supreme Court, which, in November 2009, asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for certain clarifications given that the law mirrored (and so implicated) European law. The ECJ was asked, for the first time, whether hESCs are properly described as an 'embryo' or as a 'collection of cells'. If the former, it was asked whether hESC-based inventions are permissible given the prohibition against 32. My own view is that this last statement seems to ignore the discovery exception to patenting based on rather unsatisfactory analysis grounded on little more than that the person really applied him or herself and so should be rewarded.
industrial and commercial uses contained in Article 6 BPD. It was also asked whether an invention is patentable if it necessitates the destruction of human embryos. In October 2011, the ECJ handed down its decision. While acknowledging that a 'degree of sensitivity' was warranted in articulating a definition of 'embryo', a sensitivity necessitated by the diverse traditions and value systems prevalent across the EU, it failed to demonstrate that sensitivity by engaging with the varied and deeply held (moral) positions relating to that entity. Rather, it characterised its function as defining a legal term for purposes of EU patent law, which definition must be cognizant of the aims of the instrument and the rights considered fundamental to European society. In the end, the ECJ stipulated that all terms of EU law, which do not reference the law of a specific Member State, must be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the EU, and that the term 'embryo' is such a term. In paras 30-36, it defined 'embryo' as:
1. any human ovum after fertilisation; 2. any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted; and 3. any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis.
Although these latter entities have not been fertilised, it reasoned, they are capable of commencing development into a human being and so must be excluded from patentability. So the definition was surprisingly broad. 33 On the question of whether embryos used in research trigger the 'industrial and commercial uses' prohibition, the ECJ held that they do; only if the invention has therapeutic or diagnostic uses to the embryo might it be saved. And finally, the ECJ concluded that an invention is unpatentable if its production requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their use as base material, even if the patent application does not refer to the use of human embryos: [49] The fact that destruction [of the human embryo] may occur at a stage long before the implementation of the invention, as in the case of the production of embryonic stem cells from a lineage of stem cells the mere production of which implied the destruction of human embryos is, in that regard, irrelevant.
Thus, any invention reliant on stem cells obtained from the destruction of an embryo, whenever that destruction occurred, is unpatentable.
This decision is in keeping with an earlier decision of the that inventions reliant on methods of production that necessitate the destruction of an embryo are unpatentable even if the method is not claimed in the patent application as an element for which protection is being sought. After declining to make a referral to the ECJ (based on grounds that it had no jurisdiction to do so), the EPO held as follows:
[18] On its face, the provision of Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive . . . is straightforward and prohibits the patenting if a human embryo is used for industrial or commercial purposes. Such a reading is also in line with the concern of the legislator to prevent a misuse in the sense of a commodification of human embryos . . . and with one of the essential objectives of the whole Directive to protect human dignity. This concern is also evidenced by the selective policy of the Community in funding stem cell research.
Interestingly, the EPO noted that the legislator chose not to define 'embryo', presumably because the legislator was aware of the varied definitions used in national laws. Nonetheless, it too concluded that 'embryo' should not be given a restrictive definition, and it held, without analysis, that this early stage collection of cells is an embryo, and, moreover, that its mere use for research constituted commercial or industrial application. 35 Despite having been so foreshadowed, Bru¨stle prompted strong reactions. The most common initial view was that it will have a negative impact on science; it was variously predicted that (1) opponents will pressure for public funding cuts, (2) companies will shift their investment to less restrictive jurisdictions and (3) translation of discoveries will be realised elsewhere to the detriment of the European bioeconomy and patients. 36 The European Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs stoked those fears with its Draft Opinion on the Horizon 2020 Programme which stated:
If the results of research cannot be patented, this affects the profitability of research and thus the public interest in funding it. . . . The rapporteur therefore proposes that research which either involves the destruction of human embryos or which uses human embryonic stem cells should be completely excluded from EU funding . . . . 37 35. WARF, para 25. Specifically, it said: ' . . . Making the claimed product remains commercial or industrial exploitation of the invention even where there is an intention to use that product for further research. Research and Innovation (2014-2020) , 2011/0401(COD), at 3.
Ultimately, the Committee adopted the position that public research should be commercialised and that funding decisions should be made on the availability of traditional market tools such as patents. 38 Given the dismay to which this decision has given rise, and given the need for (many) national courts to interpret and apply the decision in domestic settings, it is hardly plausible that this represents the final word on patenting stem cells in Europe. One can imagine a number of practical questions needing (judicial) answers: 39 How should products be treated when they rely on knowledge derived from research reliant on destructive practices? Should derived products be rendered unpatentable (even if they only rely on the 'tainted' element to a small degree)? What are the long-term impacts on both the existence and use of stem cell banks, in which so much public funding has been invested?
In any event, like the Myriad and Cancer Voices Australia cases, it seems likely that Bru¨stle will serve as a focal point in the battles that are ongoing over the commercialisation turn in the life sciences.
Conclusion
In the diagnostics context, opposition to patents often turns on concern over commercial companies gaining monopolies over essential diagnostic tests such that test costs increase, patient access decreases and innovation in the development of new test methods is reduced. 40 In the stem cell context, particularly where destruction of early embryos is necessitated, opposition to patents often turns on concern over the instrumentalisation of human life and the destruction of vulnerable entities and what that means for human dignity and the long-term trajectory of society. In short, opposition by those outside the commercial realm brings to bear wholly new narratives, giving rise to conflicts about ideas and ideals rather than technical criteria and the scope of claims. Until recently, the patent bar and patent institutions were happy to avoid these more fundamental debates in their working life. Indeed, the slow evolution of how the EPO, for example, has dealt with morality-based oppositions (and its still largely unsatisfactory engagement with fundamental values) suggests that patent institutions
